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Book Review 
Death By Choice by Daniel Maguire: 
Further Comments 
William E. May, Ph.D. 
In the May issue of Linacre 
Quarterly, William May and 
Daniel Maguire debated some of 
the ethical implications arising 
from Maguire's book "Death by 
Choice." This paper answers Ma-
guire's rejoinder and offers an-
other look at the ramifications of 
"intentions." 
In his rejoinder to my review 
of his provocative study (Linacre 
Quarterly, May, 1974), Professor 
Maguire stresses that the distinc-
tion between the directly intend-
ed and the indirectly intended is 
psychological in nature. Psyco-
logical considerations do, of 
course, enter into this distinction 
quite meaningfully. Nonetheless 
the distinction is not a casuistic 
means of helping men keep clean 
consciences (something that Dan-
iel Callahan says in his book on 
abortion) , but is rather a distinc-
tion that moralists have been led 
to make, as Paul Ramsey notes 
quite properly, because of their 
concern to be truthful to reality. 
I can put it this way. Our in-
tentions can relate identical phys-
ical activities to our moral identi-
ties in quite different ways. 
To change a tire for a stranded 
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motorist is a good deed if our in-
tention is to help the motorist in 
his need. To change a tire for a 
stranded motorist is something 
quite different if our intention is 
to gain her confidence so that we 
can rape her later on. Thus in-
tention is of critical significance 
in evaluation our moral deeds. 
But, and this is the central 
point that I want to make, our 
intentions cannot make our ac-
tions mean anything at all, or 
anything that we want them to 
mean. There are, in other words, 
some things that we cannot not 
intend (in the sense that we di-
rectly and of set purpose will 
them) in and through our deeds. 
I submit that we ought not to in-
tend in and through our deeds 
the destruction of true human 
goods, goods such as life, health, 
justice, friendship, peace. But fre-
quently in life we are, as it were, 
damned if we do and damned if 
we don't. That is, no matter what 
we do some one is going to get 
hurt, some human goods are go-
ing to get hurt, some human 
goods are going to be destroyed. 
I t is in these conflict situations 
that the principle of proportion-
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ality and the distinction between 
the directly intended and the in-
directly intended come into play. 
For a proportionate reason (i.e. , 
some real and realizable good) 
we may do something that will, 
in fact, result in evil or cause evil. 
And Maguire, with McCormick, 
argues that the "doing of the 
deadly deed" is at times to be jus-
tified (e.g., in some instances of 
care for the dying, war, abortion, 
etc.) in terms of the proportion-
ate good at stake (namely, hu-
man dignity and freedom). 
I concur with Maguire that the 
doing of a deadly deed requires a 
proportionate reason or propor-
tionate good. But I hold that it 
require more than this - and my 
problem with the position worked 
out by Maguire centers on his 
failure to insist on this more, for 
his methodology justifies the do-
ing of some deadly deeds (and 
some that are not deadly) .that 
are not, in my judgment, justi-
fiable. This is where the distinc-
tion between the directly intend-
ed and the indirectly intended 
comes into play, and it is not 
merely psychological. To show 
why, let us take mutilation as an 
example. To mutilate a person is 
to do wrong to him, for it is to de-
stroy his physical integrity, some-
thing really good for human be-
ings. Consider now the doctor who 
amputated the leg of Teddy Ken-
nedy's son. His act of amputation 
was, if considered from a behavior-
al or physical perspective, directly 
mutilating. Yet no one in his right 
mind would rush into the operat-
ing room and command the doc-
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tor to stop "mutilating" the boy. 
The reason is twofold. First, the 
doctor, while foreseeing infallibly 
that his act would mutilate the 
boy (and hence "willing" the mu-
tilation permissively), was not 
setting out to mutilate him - this 
was not within the scope of his 
intention. Mutilation was some-
thing that he knew infallibly 
would occur, and he permitted it 
to occur, for a proportionate rea-
son: to save the boy's life. Second, 
his action was itself, as Ramsey 
would say, "targeted" not upon 
the mutilation but upon the sav-
ing. 
The same is true of some in-
stances of doing the deadly deed: 
in cases of self-defense and the 
defense of others (see Summa 
Theologiae II-II, 64, 7, and J . 
Glenn Gray's The Warriors, pp. 
51 -53). And the same is true, I 
believe, in some instances when 
death-dealing acts are performed 
in caring for the terminally ill or 
for those dying under excruciat-
ingly painful circumstances. In 
such cases the death of a human 
being is not properly what one is 
choosing to do in and through his 
acts, nor is it what his action it-
self is targeted on or directed to-
wards. In such cases one is choos-. 
ing to perform, for a proportion-
ate reason , an act that will do 
some good (achieve a proportion-
ate good) while simultaneously, 
at least from the perspective of 
the agent and insofar as the deed 
lies within his power, effecting an 
evil: death. But neither the 
agent's intent nor the deed that 
he does is "targeted" upon the 
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death or evil that results from his 
activity. And the "direction" or 
" targeting" of the action is itself 
not something psychological: it is 
something that is, as Herbert Mc-
Cabe puts it, "quasi public," that 
is, something that can be objec-
tively determined. Yet this tar-
geting of the action is central to 
understanding the difference be-
tween the directly and the indi-
rectly intended. It is something 
really there, accessible to human 
intelligence. It is one of those 
"circumstances" of which Maguire 
speaks; it is one of the truth-
making or reality-making factors 
that simply must be taken into 
account in evaluating the mean-
ing of our moral deeds and the 
way they relate to our moral 
being. 
By contrast, some of the deeds 
that Maguire would justify, for 
instance, some acts of terminat-
ing the lives of the dying and of 
abortion, can truthfully be de-
scribed as acts of killing and as 
acts of feticide ; in them one could 
reasonably rush in and cry, "stop 
killing that person" or "stop this 
act of feticide ." 
In brief, I think Maguire's ap-
proach justifies the doing of too 
much evil in order to achieve 
some real goods. I fear that his 
approach can properly be termed 
an ethics of intended good conse-
quences (goods justifying deeds 
as proportionate reasons) or an 
ethics of good motivations (as op-
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posed to objectively good inten-
tions) . 
Frankly I do not think that 
Maguire has responded to the 
substance of my criticism of his 
methodology in his rejoinder. I 
submit that some of the deeds 
he would justify are properly de-
scribable as directly (in a moral 
sense) acts of killing, acts in 
which one of set purpose must set 
himself the good of life, must di-
rectly will its destruction because 
his act is directly targeted on 
death. On the other hand, many 
of the acts that he justifies under 
the rubric of suicide (e.g., the 
geriatric suicide of the Eskimos) 
are simply not suicidal at all, 
but are truthfully self-sacrificial, 
whereas others that he terms 
morally acts of killing are not so 
at all. 
Maguire rightly notes my de-
pendence on Grisez. But it is not 
only Grisez who has led me to the 
position that I take. In coming to 
it I have also learned much from 
Paul Ramsey, Thomas Aquinas, 
Herbert McCabe, and J. Glenn 
Gray. But principally, I believe 
(and trust that this belief is not 
self-deceptive) I take the position 
I do because of reality-making or 
truth-making factors discoverable 
in reality. I hope that I may have 
been able to point to these in my 
observations and that their sig-
nificance has been communicated 
to the reader, whose patience I 
gratefully acknowledge. 
225 
